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to provide for the support and custody of children is well recognized;4
yet "public policy" alone is not a sufficient justification for the decision
Since divorce law is statutory,17 legislative authority for the procedure
followed would be preferable.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
CHANGE IN INTERPRETATION AFTER REENACTMENT
In an aplication for naturalization, a native of Canada, a Seventh
Day Adventist, refused to promise to bear arms in defense of thif
country on the basis that the promise would be contrary to his re-
ligious belief. He was willing to do military service as a non-combatan
and was willing to take the oath of allegiance as required of alienE
by the Nationality Act of 1940,1 which does not specifically require
that petitioners for citizenship must promise to bear arms. Held:
The District Court's order admitting the applicant to citizenship was
affirmed.2 Girouard v. United States, 66 S. Ct. 826 (1946).3
The question presented is one of statutory construction. Does the
statute require an applicant for citizenship to state under oath that
he is willing to take up arms in defense of his country? A divided
court, interpreting the Naturalization Act of 1906,4 held in the
Schwimmer,5 Macintosh,6 and BlandT cases that it was an implied
requirement8 The decisions met with prolific adverse criticism.9 For
16. Kelley v. Kelley, 317 Ill. 104, 110, 147 N.E. 659, 661 (1925); Hickey
v. Thayer, 85 Kan. 556, 118 Pac. 56, 57 (1911), 41 L.R.A. (N.S.)
564 (1913).
17. Barrington v. Barrington, 206 Ala. 192, 89 So. 512, 513 (1921);
Sweigart v. State, 213 Ind. 157, 167, 12 N.E. (2d) 134, 138 (1938).
E.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 40, § 1-21.
1. 54 Stat. 1137, 1157, 8 U.S.C.A. § 735 (b) (1940).
2. The decision of the District Court of Massachusetts, admitting
him to citizenship was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals,U.S. v. Girouard, 149 F. (2d) 760 (C.A.A. 1st, 1945). The Cir-
cuit Court took its action on the authority of U.S. v. Schwimmer,279 U.S. 644 (1929); U.S. v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931);
U.S. v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931).
As a matter of statutory construction, the Court held thatCongress did not intend to require a promise to bear arms as aprerequisite to citizenship, and that judicial interpretation render-
ed prior to legislative re-enactment of the Naturalization Actdid not preclude judicial review of previous Supreme Court decisions.
3. Stone, C. J., Frankfurter and Reed, J. J., dissenting.
4. 34 Stat. 596 (1906).
5. U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
6. U.S. v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
7. U.S. v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931).
8. The Court in the principal case has adopted the dissenting opinion
of Hughes, C.J., in U.S. v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 635 (1931),
1... while recognizing the power of Congress, the mere holding
of religious or conscientious scruples against all wars should not
disqualify a citizen from holding office in this country, or an appli-
cant otherwise qualified from being admitted to citizenship. ..
9. Fields, "Conflicts in Naturalization Decisions" (1936) 10 Temp.
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the next ten years numerous bills were introduced in Congress to nullify
the effect of the decisions.10 Arguments for and against these bills
were made in committee hearings" and on the floor of Congress.12
However, all the bills died in committee. s In the meantime the
decisions were followed.14 In 1940, after studied deliberation, the
Nationality Act was revised 15 and the words of the oath were left
substantially the same as in the 1906 act;' 6 but non-combatants in
the armed forces were permitted to become citizens by an amendment
to the Second War Powers Act of 1942.17
Both majority and minority agree that the primary rule of con-
struction is to ascertain and declare the intent of the legislature.s
Legislative history affords accurate and compelling guides to legis-
lative intent.29 The majority could not find affirmative recognition
of the rule of Schwimer, Madntosh and Bland decisions in the
L. Q. 272; Carpenter, "The Promise to Bear Arms as a Prere-
quisite to Naturalized Citizenship" (1931) 10 Ore. L. Rev. 375;
Notes (1930) 3 So. Calif. L. Rev. 224 (1929) 101 Literary Di-
gest 9; (1929) 128 Nation 689; (1929) 59 New Republic 92;
(1929) 152 Outlook 250.
10. HR 3547, 71st Cong. 1st Sess., 71 Cong. Rec. 2184; HR 297,
72nd Cong. 1st Sess., 75 Cong. Rec. 95; S 3275, 72nd Cong. 1st
Sess. 75 Cong. Rec. 2600; HR 1528, 73rd Cong. 1st Sess., 77th
Cong. Rec. 90; HR 5170, 74th Cong, 1st Sess., 79th Cong. Rec.
1356; HR 8259, 75th Cong. 1st Sess., 81 Cong. Rec. 9193; S 165,
76th Cong. 1st Sess. 84 Cong Rec. 67.
11. See committee hearings on the bills listed in n. 10.
12. 72nd Cong. Rec. 6966-7; 75th Cong. Rec. 15354-7.
13. See n. 10 supra.
14. Shelley v. U.S., 120 F. (2d) 734 (App. D.C. 1941); In re Warken-
tin, 93 F. (2d) 42 (C.C.A. 7th, 1937); Beale v. U.S., 71 F. (2d)
737 (C.C.A. 8th, 1934); In re Losey, 39 F. Supp. 37 (D.C. Wash.
1941); In re Aldecoa, 22 F. Supp. 659 (D.C. Idaho 1938); Clarke's
Case, 301 Pa. 321, 152 A. 92 (1930). Contra: re John P. Klessen,
(C. P. Allen Co., Ohio 1933); In re Bubeck, (C. P. Bergen Co.,
N.J., 1933).
15. See n. 1 supra. The revision of the naturalization laws was consid-
ered by a Congressional Committee and a committee of Cabinet mem-
bers, one of whom was the Attorney General. Both committees were
aware of the Schwimmer, Macintosh, and Bland decisions.
16. Extensive changes were made in the requirements and procedure
for naturalization.
17. 56 Stat. 176, 182 (1944), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (1945).
18. The majority and minority purport to ascertain legislative intent.
See principal case at pp. 830, 831-33. Radin, "Statutory Inter-
pretation" (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 870 states that there
is no such thing as legislative intent. He modified his view in
Radin, "A Short Way with Statutes" (1942) 56 Harv. L. Rev.
388, 410, to say that debates, committee reports and the like are
neither irrelevant nor incompetent, but that they are in no sense
conroliing. See Miller, "The Value of Legislaive History of Fed-
eral Statutes" (1925) 73 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 158.
19. See Landis, "A Note on Statutory Interpretation" (1930) 43
Hamv. L. Rev. 886.
19461
INDIANA LAw JOURNAL
legislative history of the act.20 Declaring that there was an absence of
clear and explicit direction from Congress, the majority determined
what they believed was the basic legislative intent. Relying upon the
American tradition of freedom of religious belief,21 the majority stated
that they did not believe Congress intended to exact a pledge to bear
arms as a prerequisite to citizenship. They construed the failure of
any of the proposed bills to be reported out of committee as congres-
sional silence.22 Thus, the Court refused to accept what has generally
been recognized as an important extrinsic aid in statutory construe-
tion.23 The majority would review previous interpretations of statutes
in much the same manner as constitutional construction is reviewed.24
The justification for such treatment, however, is not similar; unlike
constitutional construction erroneous statutory construction can be
corrected by legislative action.25 The majority opinion encourages ju-
dicial law-making. Upon occasions it is admitted that this is nec-
essary,26 but as a general proposition judicial law-making should have
a definite and stable limit. For when the subjective determination of
policy rests with the courts rather than the legislators, the legislative
process is ignored.27
The minority determined legislative intention by a consideration
of all extrinsic evidence.28 They carefully analyzed the complete legis-
20. See principal case at p. 830.
21. See U.S. v.Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929) (dissenting opinion);
U.S. v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931) (dissenting opinion.)
22. In the interpretation of a statute it has been regarded as improper
to resort to a bill on the subject proposed in committee, but never
voted upon by the legislature. District of Columbia v. Washington
Market Co., 108 U.S. 243 (1879).
Rules against reading anything into a statute by implication
are particularly applicable to provisions expressly rejected by
the legislature. Carey v. Donohue, 240 U.S. 430 (1916); Pennsyl-
vania R.R. v. International Coal Min. Co., 230 U.S. 184 (1913).
This contention is that the court can have no means of knowing
the reasons that influenced the legislature in such rejection. Sim-
ilarly, the court can have no knowledge of the reasons that influ-
ence passage.
23. See 2 Sutherland, "Statutory Construction" (3d. ed. 1943) §§5505,
5006, 5007, 5008, 5015.
24. See Willis, "The Part of the United States Constitution Made By
The Supreme Court" (1937) 23 Iowa L. Rev. 165; Lobinger,
"Precedent in Past and Present Legal Systems" (1946) 44 Mich.
L. Rev. 955, 978, n. 128; (1946) 4 Nat. Bar. J. 137; (1946) 32
A.B.A.J. 345. See Lyon, "Old Statutes and New Constitution"
(1944) 44 Col. L. Rev. 599, 631.
25. "Courts are not responsible for the law." Thomas v. Industrial
Commission, 243 Wis. 231, 10 N.W. (2d) 206 (1943.)
26. See Horack, "In the Name of Legislative Intention" (1932) 38
W. Va. L. Q. 119.
27. To ignore legislative processes and legislative history in the pro-
cesses of interpretation, is to turn one's back on whatever history
may reveal as to the direction of the political and economic forces
of our time." Landis, "A Note on Statutory Interpretation" (1930)
43 Harv. L. Rev. 886, 892.
28. See Horack, "Cases and Materials on Legislation" (1940) 491.
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lative history and saw that the former interpretation had been pre-
sented to Congress in a precise form.29 The minority would place
the burden of proof upon those who are attempting to show that Con-
gress did not intend to adopt existing interpretations. Statutory inter-
pretation should be on the basis of the assumed acquiescence of the
members of the legislature to the prevailing interpretations.30 Grant-
ing that the Court in the first instance misinterpreted the Act of
1906, there has been abundant opportunity for Congress to give fur-
ther expression to their will.3 ' Its failure to do so amounts to ratifi-
cation.s2 Congress having adopted the statute by reenactment, neither
the department charged with its execution nor the courts should be
at liberty to disregard it.33 This properly places the responsibility of
settling controversial issues of interpretation on the legislature and
relegates the judicial function to that of making a determinable
statute somewhat more determinate8 4
SUPREME COURT
SELECTION FEDERAL JURY PANEL
Petitioner was injured when he jumped from moving train operated
by respondent. Suit in a California court alleging negligence, was
removed to federal court in San Francisco where petitioner moved to
strike jury panel as it represented "mostly business executives or those
having the employer's point of view. . ." Evidence showed the jury
commissioners excluded day laborers from the jury list since this group
probably would have been excused by the trial judge anyway on
grounds of financial hardship. Motion denied. Court of appeals
29. See n. 10 supra.
30. U.S. v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926). See U.S. v. SouthEastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (Dissenting opinion by
Stone, C.J.).
31. See n. 10 supra.
32. Manley v. Mayor, 68 Kan. 377, 75 Pac. 550 (1904); U.S. v. Elgin
J. & E. Ry., 298 U.S. 492 (1935). Contra: Rosse v. St. Paul
& D. Ry., 68 Minn. 216, 71 N.W. 20 (1897). See Sutherland,
"Statutory Construction" (3d ed. 1943) § 5109.
33. See Sutherland, "Statutory Construction" (3d ed. 1943) § 5109.
For a discussion of this problem in the field of tax and admin-
istrative law, see Alford, "Treasury Regulations with the Wilshire
Oil Case" (1940) 40 Col. L. Rev. 252; Brown, "Regulations, Re-
enactment, and the Revenue Acts" (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 377;
Feller, "Addendum to the Regulations Problem" (1941) 54 Harv.
L. Rev. 1311; Griswold, "A Summary of the Regulations Prob-
lem" (1941) 54 Harv. L. R. 398; Paul, "Use and Abuse of Tax
Regulations in Statutory Construction" (1940) 49 Yale L. J.
660; Surrey, "The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations
under the Income, Estate and Gift Taxes" (1940) 88 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 556; "If there has been a series of uniform decisions on
the same point they ought to have the force of law, because in
this case they become conclusive evidence of the law. . . " Lieber,
"Hermeneuties" (3d ed. 1880).
34. Radin, "Statutory Interpretation" (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863.
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